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Moral Realism! by AnswersInReason
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What is moral realism? What are the challenges of moral realism? well, this is a really short overview but I hope it helps! For a fuller overview please check: youtu.be/DTU0bSl1TqM

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Answers in Reason · @AnswersInReason
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Answers in Reason · @AnswersInReason
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Institutional virtues include but are by no means limited to the political, economic, and social virtues of direct democracy, horizontality, free association, communality, and intercommunality/federalism. Institutional virtues also include qualities such as mutual-aid distributive justice, justice more broadly (justice as related to the criteria of freedom and equality), practical reasoning (phronesis on an organizational and collective level), wise development and use of technics (techne), deliberative/communicative virtues, the virtue of unity in diversity, etc. Various virtues that Aristotle described–such as phronesis, techne, episteme, and justice– are not reducible to being mere properties of persons; they can also be properties of collectives.

Institutional and relational qualities can shape one another and can round one another out. For some examples: direct democracy with a form and content of horizontality is distinct from direct democracy that is entangled with hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and oppression. Direct democracy without deliberative/communicative virtues will negatively impact decision making and decisions made. Communal self-management without federalism and intercommunal mutual-aid can lead to and/or be caused by vices of parochialism and xenophobia. Self-managed production without distribution according to needs leads to distributive injustice. Horizontality without free association would inhibit the kinds of options people should have about what groups they join and what activities they do. The right kind of equality in the right ways is distinct from equality of squalor or equal rights to compete within an unjust/hierarchical system. Institutional virtues are the right kinds of specific qualities, in the right ways, in the right contexts, for the right ends. Some good institutional qualities can develop lopsidedly, yet only be made sufficiently virtuous through the mutual flourishing of multiple institutional virtues as a gestalt. Sometimes an institutional quality may merely approximate the virtue thereof rather than be sufficiently virtuous– and sometimes this happens because it is not rounded out by other institutional and/or relational virtues and gradations thereof. And even when an institutional quality is sufficiently good enough to be virtuous, it does not make it perfectly/ideally virtuous; virtuous qualities can be further rounded out and are in need of being developed overtime and recreated in differentiated and emerging contexts. And even in a good-enough society, there are additional good institutional and relational virtues that can be developed.

Given what human needs are and what human wellness consists of, flourishing virtuous institutional and relational qualities entail, include, contribute to, and are in harmony with non-hierarchical rights and duties and an expansive realm of permissibility. In contrast to statist and liberal notions of good rights so in vogue within social contract theory, good rights would at least include rights to the means of production, rights to the means of existence, rights to the means of horizontal politics and economics, rights to participatory activity and free association (and the means thereof), as well as freedom from hierarchy, domination, and exploitation. Good duties at least include the duties towards the above rights for persons and groups. Good rights and duties by themselves are not sufficient for their actuation– they require sufficient means thereof. And good rights and duties far from exhaustively encompass what is good; merely acting within such minimal bounds is not enough for a person or group to act wisely. Good rights and duties benefit from and contribute to a wider array of institutional and relational virtues. Sets of good rights and duties are institutional virtues themselves (as properties of institutions that contribute to the flourishing of volitional beings), are related to other institutional and relational virtues (in terms of cause and effect AND in terms of containing some dimensions of other institutional and relational virtues within such good rights and duties), and can be evaluated in relation to coherence and correspondence to webs of institutional and relational virtues.

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The virtue of equality is the right kinds of equality, in the right ways, in the right contexts, towards the right ends. It is constituted by the freedom from hierarchy, domination, and exploitation and constituted by the guaranteed freedoms to horizontal power and decision making processes, and equal minimal rights. The virtue of equality, understood as such, is mutually constitutive of the freedom of each and all. Within such bounds of the self-management of each and all, groups and persons can choose what actions and practices they do according to their needs, abilities, and desires– a boundaried yet relatively infinite realm of permissibility constrained only by the freedoms of others, the means thereof, and what is possible given relevant conditions and variables

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#ethics #normativeethics #philosophy #politicalphilosophy #virtues #VirtueEthics #morality #freedom #equality #moralrealism #anarchism #anarchy #communism #socialism #libertariansocialism #LibertarianCommunism #Communalism #socialecology #dialectics #dialecticalnaturalism

Last updated 1 year ago

Answers in Reason · @AnswersInReason
28 followers · 128 posts · Server masto.nu
Answers in Reason · @AnswersInReason
28 followers · 127 posts · Server masto.nu
Answers in Reason · @AnswersInReason
28 followers · 124 posts · Server masto.nu
Answers in Reason · @AnswersInReason
28 followers · 123 posts · Server masto.nu
Answers in Reason · @AnswersInReason
28 followers · 123 posts · Server masto.nu

Volition exists on a continuum in the ecological world (Bookchin 2022). Robust self-management of each and all has specific requisite qualities when it comes to political economic beings and political economic institutions. The political, economic, and social virtues of freedom and equality require each other as well as a gestalt of other institutional and relational virtues to flourish. For some examples: 1. There needs to be direct democracy so that collectives can make direct collective decisions through deliberation. 2. There needs to be both a form and content of horizontality so that collectives and individuals are free from hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and oppression and by extension able to self-determine their lives. 3. There needs to be free association so that persons and collectives choose their associations and activities. 4. There needs to be rights and duties in relation to self-management so that there are guaranteed freedoms for collectives and persons and duties towards such freedoms. 5. Self-management on every political economic scale entails communal and inter-communal self-management and the means thereof (Usufruct Collective 2022). The above qualities can be adapted and elaborated according to relevant variables while retaining their essential features. *** The above is a non-exhaustive account of political economic virtues (such political economic virtues being subsets of institutional virtues more broadly), a non-exhaustive account of what they consist of and entail, and a non-exhaustive account of reasons justifying them as such.

Institutional virtues include but are by no means limited to the political, economic, and social virtues of direct democracy, horizontality, free association, communality, and intercommunality/federalism. Institutional virtues also include qualities such as mutual-aid distributive justice, justice more broadly (justice as related to the criteria of freedom and equality), practical reasoning (phronesis on an organizational and collective level), wise development and use of technics (techne), deliberative/communicative virtues, the virtue of unity in diversity, etc. Various virtues that Aristotle described–such as phronesis, techne, episteme, and justice– are not reducible to being mere properties of persons; they can also be properties of collectives.

Institutional and relational qualities can shape one another and can round one another out. For some examples: direct democracy with a form and content of horizontality is distinct from direct democracy that is entangled with hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and oppression. Direct democracy without deliberative/communicative virtues will negatively impact decision making and decisions made. Communal self-management without federalism and intercommunal mutual-aid can lead to and/or be caused by vices of parochialism and xenophobia. Self-managed production without distribution according to needs leads to distributive injustice. Horizontality without free association would inhibit the kinds of options people should have about what groups they join and what activities they do. The right kind of equality in the right ways is distinct from equality of squalor or equal rights to compete within an unjust/hierarchical system. Institutional virtues are the right kinds of specific qualities, in the right ways, in the right contexts, for the right ends. Some good institutional qualities can develop lopsidedly, yet only be made sufficiently virtuous through the mutual flourishing of multiple institutional virtues as a gestalt. Sometimes an institutional quality may merely approximate the virtue thereof rather than be sufficiently virtuous– and sometimes this happens because it is not rounded out by other institutional and/or relational virtues and gradations thereof. And even when an institutional quality is sufficiently good enough to be virtuous, it does not make it perfectly/ideally virtuous; virtuous qualities can be further rounded out and are in need of being developed overtime and recreated in differentiated and emerging contexts. And even in a good-enough society, there are additional good institutional and relational virtues that can be developed.

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#ethics #normativeethics #philosophy #politicalphilosophy #virtues #VirtueEthics #morality #freedom #equality #moralrealism #anarchism #anarchy #communism #socialism #libertariansocialism #LibertarianCommunism #Communalism #socialecology #dialectics #dialecticalnaturalism

Last updated 1 year ago

Internal motivation towards helping others, forging good relationships, building community, self-development characteristically leads to wellbeing in those who have such virtuous internal motivations (Ryan and Deci 2022). Self-determined social relations characteristically develop wellness and virtuous character traits that give people integrated regulation to do that which is good for themselves and for others (Ryan and Deci 2022). “Integrated regulation involves doing activities because they are important for and congruent with one’s goals or values,” (Ryan and Deci 2022). Ryan and Deci, and many others, provide very good philosophical arguments enriched by mountains of scientific research demonstrating the above as well as the conclusion that, “self-determined functioning is associated with greater creativity, superior learning, better performance, enhanced well-being, and higher quality relationships,” (Ryan and Deci 2022). It is important to note the distinction in well-being and happiness as Ryan and Deci use the terms. We agree with their assessment that well-being and happiness are related yet distinct. Even though happiness is good, “Happiness cannot fully define well-being,” (Ryan and Deci 2022). “Wellness is more than merely a subjective issue,” and “In contrast, happiness (e.g., assessed by the presence of positive affect and absence of negative affect) is a subjective issue,” (Ryan and Deci 2022). But “It is not that happiness is unrelated to wellness, nor should happiness be ignored,”; Happiness is a “symptom of wellness,” that ”typically accompanies or follows from eudaimonic living and is associated with basic need satisfaction and growth,” (Ryan and Deci 2022).

Humans are not just volitional animals (nor are humans merely rational dependent animals– as relevant and true as such a notion is); humans are also institutional animals–as well as political, economic, and social animals (Bookchin 2022). Institutional animals exist within, and are able to create forms of malleable structured social organization with specific forms and functions (within the bounds of conditions and potentiality). Different qualities of institutions enable and constrain different kinds of behaviors. That which is good for humans includes good kinds of institutional forms, contents, and relations that partially define as well as enable the self-determination of each and all. When it comes to good institutions and what is good for institutional volitional beings, what is good is not a mere quantitative aggregation of hedons, happiness, and the like (as good as hedons, happiness, and the like can be); what is good for such beings includes the wellness that comes with meeting needs (including needs for sustenance and self-determination and good relatedness), a multiplicity of good institutional and relational qualities and the means thereof, qualitative rights and duties in harmony with the self-management of each and all, activities and practices entangled with and flowing from such freedom, and individual virtues. Although institutional beings have the potential to create the most horrific kinds of hierarchical formations, institutional beings also have the potential to create good sets of rights and duties, formal equality of decision making power, deliberative and democratic decision making processes, and a guaranteed minimum in terms of access to means of existence, common means of production, and horizontal politics (Bookchin 2005, 2022). Human nature and history demonstrates that depending on the presence and absence of various conditions, humans have the potential for everything from radically egalitarian relations to radically hierarchical relations (Bookchin 2005).

For political economic beings, “true freedom is to have full self-determination about one’s social economic and cultural development,” (Ervin 2021). The freedom of each and all includes the “freedom to develop as one sees fit… integrated to the fullest extent with social responsibility to others,” (Ervin 2021). The right kind of autonomy for rational, dependent, institutional, volitional, political, economic, social beings consists of: the self-management of each and all, the means thereof, political economic expressions thereof– including rights and duties in harmony with such self-management, as well as a panoply of institutional and relational qualities contributing to the living flourishing of the above. The right kind of relatedness to each other politically, economically, and socially includes and gives rise to the self-management of each and all– which itself requires certain kinds of political, economic, and social qualities and practices.

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#ethics #normativeethics #philosophy #politicalphilosophy #virtues #VirtueEthics #morality #freedom #equality #moralrealism #anarchism #anarchy #communism #socialism #libertariansocialism #LibertarianCommunism #Communalism #socialecology #dialectics #dialecticalnaturalism

Last updated 1 year ago