White House seeks input on tightening rules for risky pathogen research

#NSABB recommended expanding the reviews beyond 15 “select agents” to cover proposals to study any human, animal, or plant pathogen in seven types of experiments. One scientist has called this “a potential for disaster” that would require reviews of routine, relatively low-risk studies, such as certain experiments on cold viruses and viruses modified to fight cancer. #biosecurity #GOF #OSTP
https://www.science.org/content/article/white-house-seeks-input-tightening-rules-risky-pathogen-research

The fact that some theoretical potential to create a novel threat exists is not the only or even the most important factor in assessing the risk that the postulated novel threat will be created. Focusing attention primarily on what "could" happen skews the assessment and leads to being more receptive to invalid assumptions (e.g., "a high schooler could do this in their garage" applies to things like making E. coli glow, but not to advanced virology). #TWiV #virology #GOF #NSABB

TWiV 981: Tastes like chikungunya

Great TWiV covers the regulations surrounding dual use / gain-of-function research. I was very involved in the IC's discussion of these issues since the mid-2000s. Over time I developed exactly the same thoughts as the TWiV team about excessive alarmism and a vocal minority pushing to essentially ban all work. I found the same in certain IC agencies which eagerly made hay out of potential threats.
#TWiV #virology #GOF #NSABB

https://www.microbe.tv/twiv/twiv-981/