Rethinking Judicial Review — Jeffrey K. Walker https://jeffreykwalker.com/rethinking-judicial-review/

https://climatejustice.social/@jwalk1230@toot.community

Good overview of the supreme court, how we got here, and how it's most used power, judicial review, is self-created, not in the constitution at all, problematic, and in need of reforming.
#ReformSupremeCout
#PartisanCaptureOfJudiciary

"But Article III nowhere grants the Supreme Court authority to declare unconstitutional any federal or state legislative or administrative act. The Court’s own website admits as much:

The best-known power of the Supreme Court is judicial review [and]… is not found within the text of the Constitution itself. The Court established this doctrine in the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803).
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Marbury v. Madison (1803) was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that established for the first time that federal courts had the power to overturn an act of Congress on the grounds that it violated the U.S. Constitution. This will be testable.

Chief Justice John Marshall...made a very big legal land grab in his Marbury opinion. And regardless of how many times Marshall asserted otherwise, the power to determine constitutionality of federal and state laws and administrative acts is not an obvious, natural, or immutable prerogative of the courts.

As imminent a jurist as Justice Felix Frankfurter...said of Marbury, “Its reasoning is not impeccable and its conclusion, however wise, not inevitable.”
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There have long been eminent dissenters from the received view of judicial review as the only correct form of constitutional review. Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1820,

You seem … to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy.

During his first inaugural address in 1861 and still smarting from the overreach of the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, Abraham Lincoln asserted, “[T]he people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”
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The Supreme Court’s extra-constitutional judicial-review power rests on acquiescence by Congress and the Executive, as well as state governments. The steady decline in the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of the Court is therefore witheringly dangerous.

Is There a Better Way?
With apologies to Chief Justice Marshall, there are other ways to review the constitutionality of legislative and executive acts. I would argue, given the steadily eroding and possibly irreversible position of the Supreme Court, there are better ways, too.
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here’s what I propose as an alternative for us to ponder. It’s based on the French model, currently in use in eight countries including France.

First, divide the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction into thirds: legislative review, administrative review, and cassation review (civil and criminal appeals from lower federal courts).

Next, divvy up the Jurisdiction Pie like this:

The Supremes keep their Article III original and appellate jurisdiction, as well as cassation jurisdiction over lower federal court cases. They become a Court of Cassation for the federal judiciary, as is the case in many other countries.
Constitutional review of legislative acts—both federal and those coming from the states—goes to an Article I tribunal. Congress establishes by statute, signed by the President, a Constitutional Council. I really like how France set theirs up. Nine members appointed for nine-year terms, three by the President, and three each by the leaders of the two houses of the legislature. Also—a nice touch—all former presidents (at their option) can be members.
Constitutional review of executive-administrative acts—again federal and those coming from the states—goes to another Article I tribunal.
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It Gets Even Better
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Not being Article III judges, members of these tribunals would be subject to fixed terms.
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Even more radically, I assert that all of this can be accomplished by act of Congress and without amending the Constitution. While granting them every bit of the jurisdiction stated in Article III, the Supreme Court can be stripped of any jurisdiction not specifically enumerated there. Both of our new entities can be created, organized, and assigned jurisdiction by Congress through regular legislative process.
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Admittedly, none of what I just proposed is slam-dunk unarguable. But all I propose has a straight-faced basis in law supported by good-faith arguments.

Of course, it’s possible—even probable—the Roberts Court might declare such radical reforms, well, unconstitutional. That would be a dangerous thing, however. To paraphrase Jackson, John Roberts can make his decision; then let him enforce it."

Reforming the Courts — Jeffrey K. Walker https://jeffreykwalker.com/reforming-the-court/

https://climatejustice.social/@jwalk1230@toot.community

Interesting, and in my opinion, very viable take on reforming the Supreme Court!!

Reforming the Courts — Jeffrey K. Walker

#ReformSupremeCout
#PartisanCaptureOfJudiciary
#PartisanSupremeCourt

"There are a lot of models to choose from if—as I am—you believe our Supreme Court needs some serious refurbishment to drag it into the 21st century. So as Emperor of My Blog, here’s what I’ll do about reforming the courts, starting with the Supremes.

First, I’ll expand the bench to fifteen justices with fixed fifteen-year terms. Every president would get four appointments per four-year term.

Riffing on Mexico, I’ll give the Senate 45 days to act on a nomination—if not, the nominee goes onto the Court. Since Mexico steadfastly refuses to Pay for That Wall, the least they can do is lend us a judicial appointment process. (By the way, I’ll extend this to all federal judicial appointments.)

Results That Matter
Taken together, these changes will immediately depressurize vacancies on the Court and eliminate the horrid death watches that life tenure produces. RBG was not the first—William O. Douglas, for example, refused to resign for almost a year after a debilitating stroke left him half-paralyzed and unable to carry out his duties. Fixed terms will also make the Supreme Court a bit more responsive to changing social, cultural, and political norms. Which is a good thing.

Then I’ll divide Court into three five-justice panels, established by lot each October when the Court starts a new session. I’ll only allow the Court to sit en banc in limited circumstances. This will immediately increase efficiency and allow tripling the number of decisions issued each year.

The only parts of my reform requiring constitutional amendment will be limiting the Senate’s ability to delay confirmation to a maximum of 45 days and instituting fifteen-year terms. And the second of these isn’t entirely settled, as at least one member of Congress publicly asserted recently. Every other reform could be implemented by regular legislative order and a presidential signature."