Bibliolater 📚📜🖋📐 · @bibliolater
181 followers · 804 posts · Server qoto.org

Kelsey E Witt and others, The Impact of Modern Admixture on Archaic Human Ancestry in Human Populations, Genome Biology and Evolution, Volume 15, Issue 5, May 2023, evad066, doi.org/10.1093/gbe/evad066 @science

#openaccess #oa #science #biology #researchpapers #article

Last updated 1 year ago

Nishtha Srivastava · @nishtha_srivastava
170 followers · 49 posts · Server techhub.social

Furumara & Oishi (2023) performed Early Forecasting of Long-Period Ground Motions of Large Earthquakes using TCN in Japan Trench
agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.co

#artificialintelligence #deeplearning #earthquakes #seismology #researchpapers #research

Last updated 2 years ago

eicker.news #technews · @technews
63 followers · 306 posts · Server eicker.news

eicker.news » listed as on : many : At least four articles credit the AI tool as a co-author, as publishers scramble to regulate its use.« nature.com/articles/d41586-023

#technews #chatgpt #author #researchpapers #scientists #disapprove

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
1001 followers · 3789 posts · Server bsd.network

H. Böck, "Fermat Factorization in the Wild"¹

We are applying Fermat’s factorization algorithm to sets of public RSA keys. Fermat’s factorization allows efficiently calculating the prime factors of a composite number if the difference between the two primes is small. Knowledge of the prime factors of an RSA public key allows efficiently calculating the private key. A flawed RSA key generation function that produces close primes can therefore be attacked with Fermat’s factorization.
We discovered a small number of vulnerable devices that generate such flawed RSA keys in the wild. These affect devices from two printer vendors - Canon and Fuji Xerox. Both use an underlying cryptographic module by Rambus.


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¹ eprint.iacr.org/2023/026

#iacr #researchpapers #FermatFactorisation #canon #FujiXerox #RambusCryptographicModule

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
1001 followers · 3788 posts · Server bsd.network

F. McKee and D. Noever, "Chatbots in a Honeypot World"¹

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2301.03771

#arxiv #researchpapers #honeypot #chatgpt

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
1001 followers · 3782 posts · Server bsd.network

R. Schilling et al., "SFP: Providing System Call Flow Protection against Software and Fault Attacks" ¹

With the improvements in computing technologies, edge devices in the Internet-of-Things have become more complex. The enabler technology for these complex systems are powerful application core processors with operating system support, such as Linux. While the isolation of applications through the operating system increases the security, the interface to the kernel poses a new threat. Different attack vectors, including fault attacks and memory vulnerabilities, exploit the kernel interface to escalate privileges and take over the system.
In this work, we present SFP, a mechanism to protect the execution of system calls against software and fault attacks providing integrity to user-kernel transitions. SFP provides system call flow integrity by a two-step linking approach, which links the system call and its origin to the state of control-flow integrity. A second linking step within the kernel ensures that the right system call is executed in the kernel. Combining both linking steps ensures that only the correct system call is executed at the right location in the program and cannot be skipped. Furthermore, SFP provides dynamic CFI instrumentation and a new CFI checking policy at the edge of the kernel to verify the control-flow state of user programs before entering the kernel. We integrated SFP into FIPAC, a CFI protection scheme exploiting ARM pointer authentication. Our prototype is based on a custom LLVM-based toolchain with an instrumented runtime library combined with a custom Linux kernel to protect system calls. The evaluation of micro- and macrobenchmarks based on SPEC 2017 show an average runtime overhead of 1.9 % and 20.6 %, which is only an increase of 1.8 % over plain control-flow protection. This small impact on the performance shows the efficiency of SFP for protecting all system calls and providing integrity for the user-kernel transitions.


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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2301.02915

#arxiv #researchpapers #iot #HASP22

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
999 followers · 3780 posts · Server bsd.network

Z. Cheng et al., "Watching your call: Breaking VoLTE Privacy in LTE/5G Networks"¹

Voice over LTE (VoLTE) and Voice over NR (VoNR) are two similar technologies that have been widely deployed by operators to provide a better calling experience in LTE and 5G networks, respectively. The VoLTE/NR protocols rely on the security features of the underlying LTE/5G network to protect users' privacy such that nobody can monitor calls and learn details about call times, duration, and direction. In this paper, we introduce a new privacy attack which enables adversaries to analyse encrypted LTE/5G traffic and recover any VoLTE/NR call details. We achieve this by implementing a novel mobile-relay adversary which is able to remain undetected by using an improved physical layer parameter guessing procedure. This adversary facilitates the recovery of encrypted configuration messages exchanged between victim devices and the mobile network. We further propose an identity mapping method which enables our mobile-relay adversary to link a victim's network identifiers to the phone number efficiently, requiring a single VoLTE protocol message. We evaluate the real-world performance of our attacks using four modern commercial off-the-shelf phones and two representative, commercial network carriers. We collect over 60 hours of traffic between the phones and the mobile networks and execute 160 VoLTE calls, which we use to successfully identify patterns in the physical layer parameter allocation and in VoLTE traffic, respectively. Our real-world experiments show that our mobile-relay works as expected in all test cases, and the VoLTE activity logs recovered describe the actual communication with 100% accuracy. Finally, we show that we can link network identifiers such as International Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSI), Subscriber Concealed Identifiers (SUCI) and/or Globally Unique Temporary Identifiers (GUTI) to phone numbers while remaining undetected by the victim.

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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2301.02487

#4g #5g #volte #privacy #arxiv #researchpapers

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
986 followers · 3743 posts · Server bsd.network

R. Ma et al., "Towards Comprehensively Understanding the Run-time Security of Programmable Logic Controllers: A 3-year Empirical Study"¹

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the core control devices in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), which control and monitor the underlying physical plants such as power grids. PLCs were initially designed to work in a trusted industrial network, which however can be brittle once deployed in an Internet-facing (or penetrated) network. Yet, there is a lack of systematic empirical analysis of the run-time security of modern real-world PLCs. To close this gap, we present the first large-scale measurement on 23 off-the-shelf PLCs across 13 leading vendors. We find many common security issues and unexplored implications that should be more carefully addressed in the design and implementation. To sum up, the unsupervised logic applications can cause system resource/privilege abuse, which gives adversaries new means to hijack the control flow of a runtime system remotely (without exploiting memory vulnerabilities); 2) the improper access control mechanisms bring many unauthorized access implications; 3) the proprietary or semi-proprietary protocols are fragile regarding confidentiality and integrity protection of run-time data. We empirically evaluated the corresponding attack vectors on multiple PLCs, which demonstrates that the security implications are severe and broad. Our findings were reported to the related parties responsibly, and 20 bugs have been confirmed with 7 assigned CVEs.

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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.14296

#researchpapers #arxiv #scada #ics #plcs

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
981 followers · 3735 posts · Server bsd.network

B. Zhao et al., "One Bad Apple Spoils the Barrel: Understanding the Security Risks Introduced by Third-Party Components in IoT Firmware"¹

Currently, the development of IoT firmware heavily depends on third-party components (TPCs) to improve development efficiency. Nevertheless, TPCs are not secure, and the vulnerabilities in TPCs will influence the security of IoT firmware. Existing works pay less attention to the vulnerabilities caused by TPCs, and we still lack a comprehensive understanding of the security impact of TPC vulnerability against firmware. To fill in the knowledge gap, we design and implement FirmSec, which leverages syntactical features and control-flow graph features to detect the TPCs in firmware, and then recognizes the corresponding vulnerabilities. Based on FirmSec, we present the first large-scale analysis of the security risks raised by TPCs on 34,136 firmware images. We successfully detect 584 TPCs and identify 128,757 vulnerabilities caused by 429 CVEs. Our in-depth analysis reveals the diversity of security risks in firmware and discovers some well-known vulnerabilities are still rooted in firmware. Besides, we explore the geographical distribution of vulnerable devices and confirm that the security situation of devices in different regions varies. Our analysis also indicates that vulnerabilities caused by TPCs in firmware keep growing with the boom of the IoT ecosystem. Further analysis shows 2,478 commercial firmware images have potentially violated GPL/AGPL licensing terms.

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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.13716

#arxiv #researchpapers #iot #firmware #ThirdPartyComponents #supplychainsecurity

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
981 followers · 3734 posts · Server bsd.network

E. de Matsos and M. Ahvenjärvi, "seL4 Microkernel for virtualization use-cases: Potential directions towards a standard VMM"¹

Virtualization plays an essential role in providing security to computational systems by isolating execution environments. Many software solutions, called hypervisors, have been proposed to provide virtualization capabilities. However, only a few were designed for being deployed at the edge of the network, in devices with fewer computation resources when compared with servers in the Cloud. Among the few lightweight software that can play the hypervisor role, seL4 stands out by providing a small Trusted Computing Base and formally verified components, enhancing its security. Despite today being more than a decade with seL4 microkernel technology, its existing userland and tools are still scarce and not very mature. Over the last few years, the main effort has been put into increasing the maturity of the kernel itself and not the tools and applications that can be hosted on top. Therefore, it currently lacks proper support for a full-featured userland Virtual Machine Monitor, and the existing one is quite fragmented. This article discusses the potential directions to a standard VMM by presenting our view of design principles and feature set needed. This article does not intend to define a standard VMM, we intend to instigate this discussion through the seL4 community.


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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2210.04328

#arxiv #researchpapers #sel4 #vmm #virtualisation #microkernels

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
972 followers · 3723 posts · Server bsd.network

A. Vadapalli et al., "Duoram: A Bandwidth-Efficient Distributed ORAM for 2- and 3-Party Computation"¹

We design, analyze, and implement Duoram, a fast and bandwidth-efficient distributed ORAM protocol suitable for secure 2- and 3-party computation settings. Following Doerner and shelat's Floram construction (CCS 2017), Duoram leverages (2,2)-distributed point functions (DPFs) to represent PIR and PIR-writing queries compactly—but with a host of innovations that yield massive asymptotic reductions in communication cost and notable speedups in practice, even for modestly sized instances. Specifically, Duoram introduces a novel method for evaluating dot products of certain secret-shared vectors using communication that is only logarithmic in the vector length. As a result, for memories with n addressable locations, Duoram can perform a sequence of m arbitrarily interleaved reads and writes using just O(m lg n) words of communication, compared with Floram's O(m n) words. Moreover, most of this work can occur during a data-independent preprocessing phase, leaving just O (m) words of online communication cost for the sequence—i.e., a constant online communication cost per memory access.


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¹ eprint.iacr.org/2022/1747

#iacr #researchpapers #oram #ObliviousRAM

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
972 followers · 3723 posts · Server bsd.network

H. Lefeuvre et al., "Assessing the Impact of Interface Vulnerabilities in Compartmentalized Software"¹

Least-privilege separation decomposes applications into compartments limited to accessing only what they need. When compartmentalizing existing software, many approaches neglect securing the new inter-compartment interfaces, although what used to be a function call from/to a trusted component is now potentially a targeted attack from a malicious compartment. This results in an entire class of security bugs: Compartment Interface Vulnerabilities (CIVs).
This paper provides an in-depth study of CIVs. We taxonomize these issues and show that they affect all known compartmentalization approaches. We propose ConfFuzz, an in-memory fuzzer specialized to detect CIVs at possible compartment boundaries. We apply ConfFuzz to a set of 25 popular applications and 36 possible compartment APIs, to uncover a wide data-set of 629 vulnerabilities. We systematically study these issues, and extract numerous insights on the prevalence of CIVs, their causes, impact, and the complexity to address them. We stress the critical importance of CIVs in compartmentalization approaches, demonstrating an attack to extract isolated keys in OpenSSL and uncovering a decade-old vulnerability in sudo. We show, among others, that not all interfaces are affected in the same way, that API size is uncorrelated with CIV prevalence, and that addressing interface vulnerabilities goes beyond writing simple checks. We conclude the paper with guidelines for CIV-aware compartment interface design, and appeal for more research towards systematic CIV detection and mitigation.

__
¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.12904

#arxiv #researchpapers #CompartimentalisedSoftware #CompartmentInterfaceVulnerabilities

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
972 followers · 3723 posts · Server bsd.network

[Ed note: this is a really interesting paper, carefully researched and shows how mitigations are not necessarily that good (several across ITsec come to mind) until someone really when someone finally checks their worth]

J. Woo et al., "Scalable and Secure Row-Swap: Efficient and Safe Row Hammer Mitigation in Memory Systems"¹

As Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAM) scale, they are becoming increasingly susceptible to Row Hammer. By rapidly activating rows of DRAM cells (aggressor rows), attackers can exploit inter-cell interference through Row Hammer to flip bits in neighboring rows (victim rows). A recent work, called Randomized Row-Swap (RRS), proposed proactively swapping aggressor rows with randomly selected rows before an aggressor row can cause Row Hammer.
Our paper observes that RRS is neither secure nor scalable. We first propose the `Juggernaut attack pattern' that breaks RRS in under 1 day. Juggernaut exploits the fact that the mitigative action of RRS, a swap operation, can itself induce additional target row activations, defeating such a defense. Second, this paper proposes a new defense Secure Row-Swap mechanism that avoids the additional activations from swap (and unswap) operations and protects against Juggernaut. Furthermore, this paper extends Secure Row-Swap with attack detection to defend against even future attacks. While this provides better security, it also allows for securely reducing the frequency of swaps, thereby enabling Scalable and Secure Row-Swap. The Scalable and Secure Row-Swap mechanism provides years of Row Hammer protection with 3.3X lower storage overheads as compared to the RRS design. It incurs only a 0.7% slowdown as compared to a not-secure baseline for a Row Hammer threshold of 1200.


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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.12613

#arxiv #researchpapers #rowhammer #RandomizedRowSwap #SecureRowSwap

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
972 followers · 3722 posts · Server bsd.network

Y. Tang et al., "Efficiently Hardening SGX Enclaves against Memory Access Pattern Attacks via Dynamic Program Partitioning"¹

Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware transactions, enabled by Intel TSX, that return control to the software upon unexpected cache misses and interruptions so that the existing side-channel attacks exploiting these micro-architectural events can be detected and mitigated. However, existing hardening schemes scale only to small-data computation, with a typical working set smaller than one or few times (e.g., 8 times) of a CPU data cache.
This work tackles the data scalability and performance efficiency of security hardening schemes of Intel SGX enclaves against memory-access pattern side channels. The key insight is that the size of TSX transactions in the target computation is critical, both performance- and security-wise. Unlike the existing designs, this work dynamically partitions target computations to enlarge transactions while avoiding aborts, leading to lower performance overhead and improved side-channel security. We materialize the dynamic partitioning scheme and build a C++ library to monitor and model cache utilization at runtime. We further build a data analytical system using the library and implement various external oblivious algorithms. Performance evaluation shows that our work can effectively increase transaction size and reduce the execution time by up to two orders of magnitude compared with the state-of-the-art solutions.


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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.12656

#researchpapers #arxiv #sgx #EnclaveHardening

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
972 followers · 3721 posts · Server bsd.network

K. Coby Wang and M. Reiter, "Bernoulli honeywords"¹

Decoy passwords, or ``honeywords,'' planted in a credential database can alert a site to its breach if ever submitted in a login attempt. To be effective, some honeywords must appear at least as likely to be user-chosen passwords as the real ones, and honeywords must be very difficult to guess without having breached the database, to prevent false breach alarms. These goals have proved elusive, however, for heuristic honeyword generation algorithms. In this paper we explore an alternative strategy in which the defender treats honeyword selection as a Bernoulli process in which each possible password (except the user-chosen one) is selected as a honeyword independently with some fixed probability. We show how Bernoulli honeywords can be integrated into two existing system designs for leveraging honeywords: one based on a honeychecker that stores the secret index of the user-chosen password in the list of account passwords, and another that does not leverage secret state at all. We show that Bernoulli honeywords enable analytic derivation of false breach-detection probabilities irrespective of what information the attacker gathers about the sites' users; that their true and false breach-detection probabilities demonstrate compelling efficacy; and that Bernoulli honeywords can even enable performance improvements in modern honeyword system designs.

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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.12759

#arxiv #researchpapers #Honeywords #BernoulliHoneywords #databasesecurity

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
972 followers · 3720 posts · Server bsd.network

H. Lefeuvre et al., "Assessing the Impact of Interface Vulnerabilities in Compartmentalized Software"¹

Least-privilege separation decomposes applications into compartments limited to accessing only what they need. When compartmentalizing existing software, many approaches neglect securing the new inter-compartment interfaces, although what used to be a function call from/to a trusted component is now potentially a targeted attack from a malicious compartment. This results in an entire class of security bugs: Compartment Interface Vulnerabilities (CIVs).
This paper provides an in-depth study of CIVs. We taxonomize these issues and show that they affect all known compartmentalization approaches. We propose ConfFuzz, an in-memory fuzzer specialized to detect CIVs at possible compartment boundaries. We apply ConfFuzz to a set of 25 popular applications and 36 possible compartment APIs, to uncover a wide data-set of 629 vulnerabilities. We systematically study these issues, and extract numerous insights on the prevalence of CIVs, their causes, impact, and the complexity to address them. We stress the critical importance of CIVs in compartmentalization approaches, demonstrating an attack to extract isolated keys in OpenSSL and uncovering a decade-old vulnerability in sudo. We show, among others, that not all interfaces are affected in the same way, that API size is uncorrelated with CIV prevalence, and that addressing interface vulnerabilities goes beyond writing simple checks. We conclude the paper with guidelines for CIV-aware compartment interface design, and appeal for more research towards systematic CIV detection and mitigation.

__
¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.12904

#arxiv #researchpapers #CompartimentalisedSoftware #CompartmentInterfaceVulnerabilities

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
972 followers · 3719 posts · Server bsd.network

A. Vadapalli et al., "Duoram: A Bandwidth-Efficient Distributed ORAM for 2- and 3-Party Computation"¹

We design, analyze, and implement Duoram, a fast and bandwidth-efficient distributed ORAM protocol suitable for secure 2- and 3-party computation settings. Following Doerner and shelat's Floram construction (CCS 2017), Duoram leverages (2,2)-distributed point functions (DPFs) to represent PIR and PIR-writing queries compactly—but with a host of innovations that yield massive asymptotic reductions in communication cost and notable speedups in practice, even for modestly sized instances. Specifically, Duoram introduces a novel method for evaluating dot products of certain secret-shared vectors using communication that is only logarithmic in the vector length. As a result, for memories with n addressable locations, Duoram can perform a sequence of m arbitrarily interleaved reads and writes using just O(m lg n) words of communication, compared with Floram's O(m n) words. Moreover, most of this work can occur during a data-independent preprocessing phase, leaving just O (m) words of online communication cost for the sequence—i.e., a constant online communication cost per memory access.


__
¹ eprint.iacr.org/2022/1747

#iacr #researchpapers #oram #ObliviousRAM

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
972 followers · 3718 posts · Server bsd.network

A. Mahdad et al., "EarSpy: Spying Caller Speech and Identity through Tiny Vibrations of Smartphone Ear Speakers"¹

Eavesdropping from the user's smartphone is a well-known threat to the user's safety and privacy. Existing studies show that loudspeaker reverberation can inject speech into motion sensor readings, leading to speech eavesdropping. While more devastating attacks on ear speakers, which produce much smaller scale vibrations, were believed impossible to eavesdrop with zero-permission motion sensors. In this work, we revisit this important line of reach. We explore recent trends in smartphone manufacturers that include extra/powerful speakers in place of small ear speakers, and demonstrate the feasibility of using motion sensors to capture such tiny speech vibrations. We investigate the impacts of these new ear speakers on built-in motion sensors and examine the potential to elicit private speech information from the minute vibrations. Our designed system EarSpy can successfully detect word regions, time, and frequency domain features and generate a spectrogram for each word region. We train and test the extracted data using classical machine learning algorithms and convolutional neural networks. We found up to 98.66% accuracy in gender detection, 92.6% detection in speaker detection, and 56.42% detection in digit detection (which is 5X more significant than the random selection (10%)). Our result unveils the potential threat of eavesdropping on phone conversations from ear speakers using motion sensors.

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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.12151

#researchpapers #arxiv #privacy #spyware

Last updated 2 years ago

Madiana A. Argon :verified: · @madargon
709 followers · 377 posts · Server is-a.cat

Funny thing... Some time ago I browsed the web looking for info about Vitamin C. When I searched in English, I found mostly . When I searched in Polish, I got mostly blogs, some of them borderline or similar "wonders of natural therapies".
I use but I am not sure if it matters...

#researchpapers #altmed #duckduckgo #internet #browsing

Last updated 2 years ago

cynicalsecurity :cm_2: · @cynicalsecurity
962 followers · 3698 posts · Server bsd.network

J. Bayer et al., "Study on Domain Name System (DNS) Abuse: Technical Report"¹

A safe and secure Domain Name System (DNS) is of paramount importance for the digital economy and society. Malicious activities on the DNS, generally referred to as "DNS abuse" are frequent and severe problems affecting online security and undermining users' trust in the Internet. The proposed definition of DNS abuse is as follows: Domain Name System (DNS) abuse is any activity that makes use of domain names or the DNS protocol to carry out harmful or illegal activity. DNS abuse exploits the domain name registration process, the domain name resolution process, or other services associated with the domain name (e.g., shared web hosting service). Notably, we distinguish between: maliciously registered domain names: domain name registered with the malicious intent to carry out harmful or illegal activity compromised domain names: domain name registered by bona fide third-party for legitimate purposes, compromised by malicious actors to carry out harmful and illegal activity. DNS abuse disrupts, damages, or otherwise adversely impacts the DNS and the Internet infrastructure, their users or other persons.


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¹ arxiv.org/abs/2212.08879

#researchpapers #arxiv #dns

Last updated 2 years ago